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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the evolution of the Mexican-born workforce in the United States using data
drawn from the decennial U.S. Census throughout the entire 20th century. It is well known that there
has been a rapid rise in Mexican immigration to the United States in recent years. Interestingly, the
share of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. workforce declined steadily beginning in the 1920s before
beginning to rise in the 1960s. It was not until 1980 that the relative number of Mexican immigrants
in the U.S. workforce was at the 1920 level. The paper examines the trends in the relative skills and
economic performance of Mexican immigrants, and contrasts this evolution with that experienced
by other immigrants arriving in the United States during the period. The paper also examines the
costs and benefits of this influx by examining how the Mexican influx has altered economic
opportunities in the most affected labor markets and by discussing how the relative prices of goods
and services produced by Mexican immigrants may have changed over time.
George J. Borjas
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I.  Introduction 
  The population of Mexican-born persons residing in the United States has increased at an 
unprecedented rate in recent decades. This increase can be attributed to both legal and illegal 
immigration. During the entire decade of the 1950s, only about 300 thousand legal Mexican 
immigrants entered the United States, making up 12 percent of the immigrant flow.  In the 
1990s, 2.2 million Mexicans entered the United States legally, making up almost 25 percent of 
the legal flow (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2002). In addition, it is estimated 
that (as of January 2000) there were 7 million illegal aliens residing in the United States, with 
4.8 million (68 percent of this stock) being of Mexican origin (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
2004). As a result of the increase in the number of legal and illegal Mexican immigrants, nearly 
9.2 million Mexican-born persons resided in the United States in 2000, comprising about 29.5 
percent of the foreign-born population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003). 
  It is instructive to place the Mexican immigrant influx of the late 20
th century in the 
context of earlier immigrant flows. In 1920, towards the end of the First Great Migration, the 
largest two national origin populations enumerated by the 1920 Census were Germans and 
Italians, and together these two populations comprised about 23.7 percent of the foreign-born 
population at the time (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975). From this perspective, it is clear that 
the Mexican-born population of the late 20
th Century is historically unprecedented, being both 
numerically and proportionately larger than any other immigrant influx in the past century. 
                                                 
* Harvard University and National Bureau of Economic Research.    2
  This paper analyzes the evolution of Mexican immigration as a component of the U.S. 
workforce during the 20
th Century. As a result of the rapidly increasing Mexican immigrant 
influx described earlier, the fraction of the workforce composed of Mexican-born workers 
increased rapidly after 1970. As the top panel of Figure 1 shows, only 0.4 percent of the 
workforce aged 18-64 in 1970 was composed of Mexican-born workers. By 2000, the Mexican 
immigrant share had increased to 4.0 percent. The increase is even larger in the male workforce, 
where 0.5 percent of working men were Mexican-born in 1970 and 5.1 percent in 2000. 
It is of interest to contrast the explosion of Mexican workers in the U.S. workforce in the 
late 20
th Century with the demographic trends at the beginning of the century. Although Mexican 
immigration was relatively small in the early 1900s, the relative number of Mexican immigrants 
in the U.S. workforce increased to 0.6 percent in 1920 (and continued rising until the late 1920s). 
The halting of European migration to the United States with the outbreak of World War I 
followed by Congressional action to restrict immigration combined with strong labor demand in 
the booms of the late 1910s and the 1920s engendered substantial efforts by U.S. employers to 
recruit Mexican laborers through private labor contractors (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002).1 
Remarkably, the Mexican immigrant share went into a long steady decline after the 1920s that 
lasted for several decades. It was not until the1970s that the Mexican immigrant share of the 
workforce was at least as large as it was in the1920s! 
The reasons for the declining Mexican share in the workforce are not entirely clear.2 
Until 1965, there was not a numerical limitation on immigration from countries in the Western 
                                                 
1 Mexican immigrants were exempted from the head tax and literacy test imposed on new arrivals in 1917 
and from the national origin quotas of the immigration restriction acts of the 1920s. 
2 Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) argue that the weak U.S. labor market of the Great Depression 
generated more hostile attitudes of U.S. citizens towards Mexican immigrants and created political pressures leading   3
Hemisphere. In theory, at least, legal migration from Mexico was guided by a “first-come, first-
served” approach. Potential immigrants applied for entry and local consular officials had a great 
deal of discretion in determining which applicants would be provided entry visas. 
To ease the labor force shortage caused by World War II in the agricultural industry 
during the early 1940s, the bracero program was launched on August 4, 1942. This guest-worker 
program brought almost 5 million Mexican-born farm workers to the United States between 
1942 and 1964, when it was abruptly terminated by the United States. The main reason given for 
the discontinuation of the program at the time was the assertion that the bracero program 
depressed the wages of native-born Americans in the agricultural industry (Massey and Liang, 
1989; Marcell, 1994). 
The latest wave of illegal immigration from Mexico began in the late 1960s, after the 
discontinuation of the bracero program. There is, in fact, a clear link between the end of the 
bracero program and the beginning of the illegal alien flow, at least as measured by the number 
of Mexican nationals aliens apprehended as they attempt to enter the United States illegally. The 
number of Mexican illegal aliens apprehended by the Border Patrol began to increase soon after 
the bracero program ended. In 1964, for example, the Border Patrol apprehended only 41.6 
thousand Mexican illegal aliens. By 1970, apprehensions were up to 348.2 thousand annually. In 
1986, about 1.7 million Mexican illegal aliens were apprehended (U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, various issues). 
  Although the discontinuation of the bracero program may help explain why illegal 
immigration accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s, there are several questions that remain 
                                                                                                                                                             
to several highly-publicized mass deportations of Mexican immigrants over the course of the 1930s.  These 
changing economic incentives and immigration policies may have played a key role in stemming Mexican migration 
to the United States and even reducing the absolute number of Mexican working in the United States during the 
1930s.   4
unanswered. The wage gap between Mexico and the United States has been large for many 
decades, and it is far from clear that it is larger now than it was at the beginning or middle of the 
20
th Century. Why then didn’t we observe large flow of Mexican immigrants prior to the 1970s? 
It is possible, of course, that the policy changes initiated by the 1965 Amendments and 
subsequent legislation, which made family reunification the central goal of immigration policy, 
could have eased the entry of Mexicans in the United States, but, at least in theory, Mexican 
immigration was not greatly restricted prior to the post-1965 policy shifts? Why did so few 
Mexicans take advantage of it? Or were the institutional barriers placed at the consular level in 
Mexico so forbidding that relatively few Mexicans even bothered to apply to enter the United 
States? 
We do not know the answers to these questions. What we do know, however, is that the 
Mexican immigrant population today stands out from the rest of the immigrant population in two 
striking ways. It is well known, of course, that there has also been a sizable increase in the 
number of non-Mexican immigrants admitted to the United States. Nevertheless, Mexican 
immigrants comprise an ever-larger fraction of the foreign-born stock of the United States (see 
Figure 2). Second, as we will document, Mexican immigrants tend to have demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics that differ significantly not only from that of the native-born 
population, but from that of other immigrants as well. In general, the economic performance of 
Mexican immigrants lags significantly behind that of other immigrant groups and this lagging 
performance is, to an important extent, transmitted to future generations of native-born workers 
of Mexican ancestry.   5
This paper differs from earlier contributions in the immigration literature by focusing 
specifically on the evolution of the Mexican-born workforce in the United States.3 We use data 
drawn from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) of the decennial U.S. Census 
throughout the entire 20
th century to describe the demographic and economic evolution of this 
population. The paper examines the evolution of the relative skills and economic performance of 
Mexican immigrants, and contrasts this evolution to that experienced by other immigrants 
arriving in the United States during the period. The paper also examines the costs and benefits of 
this influx by examining how the Mexican influx has altered economic opportunities in the most 
affected labor markets and by discussing how the relative prices of goods and services produced 
by Mexican immigrants may have changed over time. 
 
II. Data and Key Trends 
  The analysis uses data drawn from all of the available Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Samples (IPUMS) of the U.S. Decennial Census between 1900 and 2000.4 This long-term look at 
the available data helps to provide a historical account of the evolution and economic 
performance of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. workforce. 
                                                 
3 Important exceptions include Feliciano (2001), who examines the economic performance of Mexican 
immigrants through 1990; Camarota (2001), who attempts a cost-benefit analysis of Mexican immigration; and 
Trejo (2003), who studies the intergenerational mobility of Mexican-origin workers in the U.S. labor market. 
Broader analyses of immigrant and Hispanic labor market performance in the United States include Borjas (1985, 
1995); Funkhouser and Trejo (1995); and LaLonde and Topel (1992). 
4 IPUMS samples are currently available for every decennial census in the 20
th century except for 1930.   6
Throughout the analysis, a person is classified as an “immigrant” if he or she was born in 
a foreign country; all other workers are classified as “natives”.5 Persons who are immigrants and 
who were born in Mexico comprise the sample of Mexican immigrants. The pre-1970 Censuses 
comprise (roughly) a 1 percent random sample of the population. Beginning with 1980, the data 
comprise a 5 percent random sample of the population. The entire available sample in each 
Census is used in the empirical analysis.  
In each Census, the study is restricted to persons aged 18-64 who work in the civilian 
sector, are not enrolled in school, and do not reside in group quarters.6 When appropriate, the 
sampling weights reported in the IPUMS data are used in the calculations. 
 
The Geographic Sorting of Mexican Immigrants 
  Table 1 begins the empirical analysis by documenting how the geographic sorting of 
Mexican immigrants in the United States changed over the 20
th century. The top panel of the 
table reports the share of the stock of Mexican immigrants (both male and female) who reside in 
                                                 
5 Persons born abroad of American parents and persons born in a U.S. possession are also classified as 
natives. It is important to note that the Census data contain both legal Mexican immigrants as well as those illegal 
immigrants who answered the Census questionnaire. 
6 In the 1940-2000 samples, the study is also restricted to workers who report positive weeks worked and 
hours worked weekly, and positive earnings in the calendar year prior to the survey. Prior to 1980, the information 
on hours worked refers to hours worked last week; in the 1980-2000 Censuses, the information refers to usual hours 
worked weekly. In the 1960-1970 Censuses, weeks worked are reported as a categorical variable. We imputed 
weeks worked for each worker as follows: 6.5 weeks for 13 weeks or less, 20 for 14-26 weeks, 33 for 27-39 weeks, 
43.5 for 40-47 weeks, 48.5 for 48-49 weeks, and 51 for 50-52 weeks. Similarly, in the 1960-1970 Censuses, hours 
worked last week are reported as a categorical variable. We imputed weekly hours worked for each worker as 
follows: 7.5 hours for 1-14 hours, 22 for 15-29 hours, 32 for 30-34 hours, 37 for 35-39 hours, 40 for 40 hours 
exactly, 44.5 for 41-48 hours, 54 for 49-59 hours, and 70 for at least 60 hours. In the 1940-1980 Censuses, the top 
coded annual salary is multiplied by 1.5. We calculated a wage rate for each worker by taking the ratio of annual 
earnings to the product of weeks worked and hours worked weekly. We restrict the analysis in each Census to 
workers whose calculated hourly wage rate lies between $1 and $250 (in 1999 dollars).    7
a particular state at a particular point in time, while the bottom panel reports the fraction of the 
state’s workforce that is composed of Mexican immigrants. 
  The top panel of Table 1 reports an important trend: a steady and substantial 
redistribution in Mexican immigration from Texas to California throughout much of the 20
th 
century. In 1900, for example, 62.5 percent of Mexican immigrants lived in Texas, and only 7.8 
percent lived in California. By 1950, roughly equal numbers of Mexican immigrants lived in 
Texas (39.1 percent) and California (40.3 percent). By 1980, almost 60 percent of Mexican 
immigrants lived in California and the fraction of living in Texas had further declined to 21.2 
percent. Between 1980 and 2000, however, California seemed to become a relatively less 
attractive destination for Mexican immigrants. By 2000, the fraction of Mexican immigrants 
living there had declined to 42.1 percent. Note, however, that this decline was not accompanied 
by an increase in the fraction choosing to reside in Texas; that share was relatively constant over 
the period. 
Table 1 also shows that the recent decline in the relative share of Mexican immigrants 
who choose to live in California has been accompanied by a remarkable increase in Mexican 
immigration to states that had never been the recipients of large numbers of these immigrants. In 
1980, for example, Mexican immigrants had, at best, a negligible presence in both North 
Carolina and Georgia. By 2000, however, almost 3.0 percent of the workforce in each of these 
states was composed of Mexican immigrants. Similarly, less than 1 percent of workers in 
Colorado were Mexican-born in 1980; by 2000, almost 5 percent of Colorado’s workforce was 
Mexican-born. Although often noted in the popular press, this remarkable and sudden shift in the 
geographic sorting of Mexican immigrants in the United States has received little systematic   8
analysis and the reasons leading to the dramatic geographic redistribution are still not well 
understood.7 
Because there were relatively few Mexican immigrants living in the United States at the 
beginning of the 20
th century, it is worth noting that even though nearly two thirds of Mexican 
immigrants lived in Texas in 1900, only 3.4 percent of the Texas workforce was Mexican-born. 
By 2000, however, nearly 14.8 percent of the California workforce and 10.9 percent of the Texas 
workforce were Mexican-born. The relative importance of Mexican immigration as a component 
of the workforce of the main immigrant-receiving states, therefore, now stands now at a historic 
high. The growth has been most dramatic in California. In 1970, only 2.4 percent of California’s 
workforce was Mexican-born. By 2000, this statistic had increased six-fold, to 14.8 percent. 
 
Trends in Educational Attainment and Occupation 
The skill composition of the Mexican immigrant workforce differs strikingly from that of 
the native workforce as well as from that of other immigrants. We begin the description of the 
skill composition of the various groups by comparing the trend in the educational attainment of 
native working men with that of Mexican immigrant men. The Census provides data on 
educational attainment beginning in 1940, so that this phase of the study focuses on the trends in 
the post-1940 period. As Table 2 shows, 67.3 percent of male native-born working men were 
high-school dropouts in 1940.8 This high native dropout rate was lower than that of Mexican 
immigrant men, where 94.6 percent had not completed high school. To provide a point of 
                                                 
7 See Card and Lewis (2005) for an initial analysis of the geographic redistribution of Mexican immigrants 
during the 1990s. 
8 We refer to anyone with fewer than 12 years of completed schooling as a high school dropout.   9
reference for these statistics, the table also reports that 84.4 percent of non-Mexican immigrant 
working men at that time were high school dropouts.9 
By 2000, the fraction of male native-born workers who are high school dropouts had 
fallen by almost 60 percentage points, to 8.7 percent. In contrast, the fraction of Mexican-born 
high school dropouts had fallen by only about 30 percentage points, to 63.0 percent. Again, as a 
reference point, note that the fraction of high school dropouts in the non-Mexican immigrant 
population had fallen by almost as much as in the native-born workforce, to 17.0 percent. As a 
result of these trends, the data indicate a remarkable fact: the population of male high school 
dropouts in the United States has become disproportionately Mexican-born. In 1940, 0.5 percent 
of all male high school dropouts were Mexican immigrants. Even as recently as 1980, only 4.1 
percent of male high school dropouts were Mexican immigrants. By 2000, however, 26.2 percent 
of all male high school dropouts were Mexican born. 
The growing disadvantage of Mexican immigrants at the bottom of the educational 
attainment distribution is matched by an equally growing disadvantage at the top of the 
distribution, where a fast-growing number of native workers and non-Mexican immigrants are 
college graduates. In 1940, there was relatively little difference in college graduation rates 
among the three groups; by 2000, however, there is a wide gulf separating college graduation 
rates between Mexican immigrants and the other groups. In particular, 6.3 percent of native 
working men were college graduates in 1940, and this fraction had quadrupled to 27.4 percent by 
2000. Similarly, 3.7 percent of non-Mexican immigrant men were college graduates in 1940, and 
this fraction had increased almost ten-fold to 36.3 percent by 2000. In contrast, only 1.4 percent 
                                                 
9 Information on literacy in the 1900 to 1920 censuses suggests a similar educational gap for Mexican 
immigrant workers in the early 20
th century.  For example, the literacy rate for Mexican-born male workers was   10
of Mexican immigrant men in 1940 were college graduates; by 2000, the college graduation 
remained a miniscule 3.4 percent in this group of workers. 
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the trends in the education distribution for working 
women. The trends are similar to those reported for the various groups of working men, though 
not as dramatic. For example, the high school dropout rate of native women dropped by 44 
percentage points between 1940 and 2000 (from 50.6 to 6.5 percent), as compared to the almost 
60 percentage point drop experienced by native men. Similarly, the high school dropout rate for 
Mexican immigrant women dropped by 28 percentage points (from 84.5 to 57.0 percent), as 
compared to the 32 percentage point drop experienced by Mexican immigrant men. These data 
patterns presage a systematic finding in much of our analysis: the differences exhibited by the 
various groups of working women mirror those exhibited among the respective groups of 
working men, but are less extreme. As a result of this similarity, much of the discussion that 
follows will focus on the trends observed in the sample of working men (even though many of 
the tables will report the respective statistics for working women). By focusing on the trends 
exhibited by working men, we can avoid the difficult conceptual and econometric issues 
introduced by the interpretation of skill and wage trends for working women during a period of 
rapidly rising female labor force participation rates. 
  Finally, Table 3 illustrates the changing occupational distribution of Mexican immigrants 
by listing the “Top Ten” occupations employing these workers. The IPUMS data recode the very 
different occupation codes used by the various Censuses into a single occupation categorization 
based on the 1950 Census definitions. We use this simplifying recoding to compare the 
occupation distribution of workers across Censuses. 
                                                                                                                                                             
50.1 percent in 1910 as compared to 92.8 percent for native-born male workers and 87.0 percent for non-Mexican   11
Not surprisingly, such low-skill occupations as laborers, farm laborers, gardeners and 
cooks, dominate the occupational distribution of Mexican immigrants. It is worth noting, 
however, that there seems to be much less occupational clustering among Mexican immigrants in 
the late 1900s than there was at the beginning of the century. In 1900, for example, almost two-
thirds of Mexican immigrant men were employed as laborers or farm laborers. In 2000, the 
largest concentration of Mexican immigrant men is found in operatives (not elsewhere 
classified), which employs “only” 15.5 percent of the workers.  
 
Trends in the Relative Wage 
The growing disadvantage in the educational attainment of Mexican immigrants clearly 
implies a growing disadvantage in relative wages. Beginning in 1940, the IPUMS reports the 
worker’s annual earned income in the year prior to the Census. We divided the reported annual 
earned income by the reported number of weeks worked (in the subsample of workers who 
reported a positive number of weeks worked) to calculate the weekly wage for each worker.10 
Table 4 documents that the relative log weekly wage of both Mexican and non-Mexican 
immigrants fell steeply between 1940 and 2000. Panel A of the table reports the trend in the log 
weekly wage of male Mexican and non-Mexican immigrants relative to the log weekly wage of 
native-born working men. It is instructive to begin the discussion by observing the trend in the 
relative log weekly wage of non-Mexican immigrants. Table 4 shows that there was a sizable 
and steady decline in the relative wage of non-Mexican immigrants between 1940 and 2000. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
immigrant working men. 
10 The sample includes self-employed workers. The worker’s annual earned income is then defined as the 
sum of wage and salary income and self-employment income, except in 1940 when the Census does not report 
detailed information on self-employment income. Similar trends are revealed when the analysis is restricted only to 
salaried workers.   12
1940, the typical non-Mexican immigrant man earned about .18 log points more than the typical 
native worker. By 2000, the typical non-Mexican immigrant man earned about .03 log points less 
than the typical native-born worker. This decline in the relative immigrant economic 
performance of immigrants has been a subject of intensive (and contentious) debate in recent 
years (Borjas 1985, 1995; Chiswick 1986; LaLonde and Topel 1992; Yuengert, 1994).  
The table also shows that, although the magnitude of the wage disadvantage of Mexican 
immigrant men is much larger than that of their non-Mexican counterparts, there has not been a 
steady downward trend in relative economic performance among Mexican immigrants. For 
example, the log weekly wage of Mexican immigrants was -.48 log points lower than that of 
native-born workers in 1940. This wage disadvantage, in fact, narrowed to around -.39 log points 
by 1970, before growing again to -.53 log points in 2000. It is worth stressing that although the 
relative economic performance of Mexican immigrants does not seem to have worsened 
substantially over the past few decades, Mexican immigrants have always suffered a substantial 
handicap in the labor market. A log point difference of -.53 implies an approximate 41 percent 
wage gap relative to natives for Mexican immigrants, as compared to only a 3 percent wage gap 
for the non-Mexican immigrant population in 2000. 
As we showed earlier, there has been an increasing gap in educational attainment 
between Mexican immigrants and native-born workers. It is of interest to determine, therefore, 
whether differences in educational attainment and other observed measures of human capital 
explain the sizable wage gap between Mexican immigrants and native men. To illustrate the key 
importance of observable socioeconomic characteristics in determining the relatively low wage 
of Mexican immigrants we estimated the following generic regression model separately in each 
Census:   13
 
(1)   log  wjt = Xjt βt + δt Ijt + εjt, 
 
where wjt gives the log weekly wage of worker j in year t; X is a vector of socioeconomic 
characteristics (defined below); and Ijt is a vector of two variables indicating if worker j is a 
Mexican immigrant or a non-Mexican immigrant. Depending on the specification of the 
regression model, the vector X can contain vector of dummy variables indicating the worker’s 
education (less than high school, high school graduate, some college, or college graduate), a 
third-order polynomial in the worker’s age, and a vector of fixed effects indicating the state of 
residence.11 
  Panel B of Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of the parameter vector δ when the 
vector of standardizing variables includes only the worker’s education and age. The results are 
striking. In 1940, the observed difference in socioeconomic characteristics, and particularly 
educational attainment, explain almost nothing of the sizable wage gap between Mexican 
immigrants and native-born men. The observed wage gap was -.475 log points and the adjusted 
wage gap was -.453. By 1970, the minimal set of variables included in the vector X is an 
important determinant of the wage gap. In 1970, the observed wage gap stood at -.390 log points 
and the adjusted wage gap was -.205, so that the observed human capital variables explained 
roughly half of the observed wage gap. Beginning in 1980, the adjusted wage gap has remained 
stable at around -.15 log points, so that a very large fraction of the observed wage gap (over 70 
                                                 
11 This regression model can be easily expanded to allow for different vectors of coefficients for the 
various groups. This more general specification leads to results that are similar to those reported in the paper. For 
simplicity, we choose to report the findings from the most basic regression specification.    14
percent of the -.53 wage gap in 2000) can be attributed to differences in socioeconomic 
characteristics, and particularly the very large difference in educational attainment.12 
  It also turns out that by 2000 the observed differences in human capital—and again most 
particularly the observed difference in educational attainment—explains practically all of the 
wage gap between non-Mexican immigrants and Mexican immigrants. In 2000, for example, the 
adjusted relative wage of non-Mexican immigrants is -.07 log points, in contrast to a -.14 log 
point difference for Mexican immigrants. The .07 log point difference in adjusted relative wages 
between the two groups of immigrant workers stands in sharp contrast to the .50 log point 
difference in observed wages. Put differently, practically the entire wage gap between the two 
groups of immigrants can be explained through the fact that they differ in their levels of 
observed human capital—particularly educational attainment. 
  Panel C of Table 4 replicates the regression analysis after adding in a vector of fixed 
effects indicating the worker’s state of residence. These fixed effects could conceivably be very 
important since there is a great deal of geographic clustering among immigrants, and the states 
where immigrants tend to cluster may be high-wage states. The regression coefficients reported 
in the table, however, indicate that the quantitative changes in the size of the adjusted wage gaps 
are relatively small so that none of the key findings reported above are affected by the inclusion 
of the state fixed effects. 
  Finally, the bottom panels of Table 4 replicate the analysis using the sample of female 
workers. As noted earlier, the trends tend to be quite similar to those found among working men. 
                                                 
12 The fact that age and educational attainment explain a large part of the wage gap in recent decades but 
almost none of the gap in 1940 and 1950 is explained by the fact that, although there was a large gap in educational 
attainment in the earlier years, Mexican immigrants were substantially older than native workers in 1940 and 1950 
and roughly the same age as natives after 1970. For example, the mean age of Mexican immigrants in 1940 was   15
In 2000, the relative wage of female Mexican immigrants stood at -.40 log points, as compared 
to an advantage of +.04 log points for female non-Mexican immigrants. Much of the wage 
disadvantage experienced by Mexican immigrant women, however, disappears once the 
regression model controls for differences in educational attainment among the groups. In 
particular, the -.40 log point wage gap falls to a -.07 wage gap when the regression model 
controls for educational attainment and age. In other words, a minimal set of skill characteristics, 
explains about 80 percent of the wage gap between Mexican and native women. 
 
Cohort Effects 
  The literature that documents the trends in immigrant skills stresses the importance of 
cohort and assimilation effects in generating the secular trends in the wage gap between 
immigrants and natives reported in Table 4. After all, the wage of Mexican (or non-Mexican) 
immigrants may be changing over time either because newer waves of immigrants have 
inherently different skills than earlier waves, or because earlier waves are acquiring valuable 
skills as they adapt to the U.S. labor market. It is of great interest to investigate the relative 
importance of both of these factors to examine the wage evolution experienced by the Mexican-
born workforce in the United States. 
Instead of developing a parametric model to summarize the various trends, we use a 
simple framework that attempts to characterize the underlying trends without imposing any 
structure on the data. Consider, in particular, the trend in the relative wage of immigrants who, as 
                                                                                                                                                             
45.9 years, as compared to 36.4 years for natives. In 2000, the mean age of the two groups is 40.7 and 40.5 years, 
respectively.   16
of the time of the Census, have been in the United States fewer than 5 years.13 The trend in the 
relative wage of these immigrants would identify the cohort effect that characterizes the most 
recent wave observed in each of the Censuses.14 Panel A of Table 5 reports the relative wage of 
these newly arrived Mexican and non-Mexican immigrants in each of the Censuses where the 
data are available. 
  The data clearly suggest a steady decline in the relative wage of successive waves of 
newly arrived Mexican immigrants from 1940 through 1990. The most recently arrived Mexican 
immigrant wave enumerated in the 1940 Census (i.e., the 1945-1949 arrivals) earned -.34 log 
points less than natives in 1940. By 1990, the latest wave of Mexican immigrants enumerated in 
that Census earned .81 log points less than natives. This decline was reversed slightly in the 
1990s. In 2000, the latest wave of Mexican immigrants earned .76 log points less than native 
workers. To provide some perspective, note that a -.76 log wage gap implies a 53 percent wage 
differential between Mexican immigrants and natives at the time of arrival. 
A similar decline in the relative wage of successive immigrant cohorts—although the 
magnitude of the relative wage disadvantage is not as large—is clear in the sample of non-
Mexican immigrants. In 1940, the most recently arrived non-Mexican immigrants earned .10 
more log points than native workers; by 1970, the relative wage of the most recent cohort stood 
at -.16; by 1990 it stood at -29. This long-term decline in the relative wage of newly arrived 
immigrants was reversed in the 1990s. In 2000, the newly arrived non-Mexican immigrants 
earned .20 log points less than native workers. 
                                                 
13 The 1950 Census does not provide this information so that the relative wage of the most recently arrived 
5-year cohort cannot be measured. 
14 This assertion, of course, assumes that the period effect is neutral between the immigrant population and 
the baseline reference group.   17
The relative wage trends of successive immigrant cohorts of both Mexican and non-
Mexican immigrants, therefore, imply a very similar trend in cohort effects in the period between 
1940 and 1990—a decline in the relative earnings of newly arrived immigrants from 1940 
through 1990, and then a reversal in the 1990s. This reversal was relatively modest for Mexican 
immigrants and quite sharp for non-Mexican immigrants. 
Two points are worth emphasizing about these trends. First, although the U-shaped trends 
in cohort effects are very similar between the two groups of immigrants, the magnitude of the 
relative wage disadvantage at the time of entry is far greater for the Mexican population. In 
2000, the typical newly arrived Mexican immigrant earned 53.4 percent less than the typical 
native worker, as compared to an 18.4 percent wage disadvantage for non-Mexican immigrants. 
Secondly, a recent study by Borjas and Friedberg (2004) documents that the “uptick” in 
the cohort effect for (all) immigrants who arrived in the late 1990s can be explained in terms of a 
simple story that has significant policy relevance. In particular, the uptick documented in the 
entire sample of immigrants disappears when the relatively small number of immigrants who are 
employed as computer scientists and engineers is excluded from the analysis.15 In both 1980 and 
1990, fewer than 5 percent of the newly arrived immigrants worked in these high-tech 
occupations. By 2000, however, 11.1 percent of the newly-arrived immigrants worked in these 
occupations. 
Although the Census data does not provide information on the type of visa immigrants 
used to enter the country, it is probably not a coincidence that this increase in the relative 
number of high-tech immigrants occurred at the same time that the size of the H-1B visa 
                                                 
15 The occupation codes used to define the sample of computer scientists and engineers in each Census are: 
80-93 in 1960; 3, 4, 6-23, in 1970; 44-59, 64, 229 in 1970 and 1980; 100-111, 132-153 in 2000.   18
program grew substantially. This program allows employers to sponsor the entry of temporary 
workers in “specialty occupations.” In fact, 70 percent of the workers entering the country with 
an H-1B visa in 2000 are employed either in computer-related occupations or in engineering 
(U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2002). Between 1990 and 1994, about 100,000 H-
1B visas were granted each year. In 1996, this number increased to 144,548; to 240,947 in 1998; 
and to 302, 326 in 1999 (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, various issues). It seems, 
therefore, that the “in-sourcing” of high-tech workers through the H-1B program reversed the 
long-standing trend of declining relative skills in successive cohorts of new immigrants.  
It is extremely unlikely, however, that the H-1B program can explain the modest uptick 
observed in the cohort effects for Mexican immigrants during the late 1990s. After all, the 
number of Mexican-born workers in the newly arrived sample in the 2000 Census who are 
employed as computer scientists or engineers is miniscule (0.6 percent for Mexican immigrants 
as compared to 9.5 percent for non-Mexican immigrants). It seems, therefore, that the 
improvement in the relative economic status of newly arrived Mexican immigrants in the late 
1990s may reflect either an increase in the overall skills of the sample or a period effect that is 
not yet fully understood (although it is well known that wages for low-skill workers increased 
markedly during this period as shown, for example, in Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2004). 
Panel B of Table 5 continues the analysis of the cohort effects by reporting the adjusted 
wage differential between the sample of newly arrived immigrants and native-born workers 
when the regression model includes the age and education variables, and Panel C adds the state 
of residence fixed effects. The adjusted log wage differentials reported in the table are obtained 
by estimating a regression model similar to that presented in equation (1), but including only the 
samples of native workers and the most recently arrived immigrants in each Census. The   19
comparison of the adjusted (from panel B) and unadjusted log wage gaps reveal a number of 
interesting findings. First, a minimal vector of skill characteristics explains a great deal of the 
wage gap between newly arrived Mexican immigrants and native workers, but explains only a 
relatively small part of the wage gap between non-Mexican immigrants and natives. For 
example, in 2000 there was a -.76 unadjusted log wage gap between recent Mexican immigrants 
and natives. Adjusting for differences in education and age reduces the wage gap to -.16 log 
points, so that the observed skill characteristics explain about 80 percent of the observed wage 
gap. In contrast, the observed wage gap for recent non-Mexican immigrants is -.20 log points 
and the adjusted wage gap is -.16 log points, so that differences in education and age explain 
only about a fifth of the observed wage gap in this population. 
A second important insight provided by Table 5 is that the very large wage gap between 
non-Mexican and Mexican newly-arrived immigrants is almost entirely due to differences in 
educational attainment and age, particularly in recent years.  In 2000, for example, the regression 
coefficients imply that there was an unadjusted wage gap of -.56 log points between Mexican 
and non-Mexican immigrants, but that adjusting for education and age reduced this wage gap to 
only about -.015 log points. In short, the regressions yield the important conclusion that the 
reason that recent Mexican immigrants earn far less than their non-Mexican counterparts has 
appears to have little to do with the fact that they are Mexican, but has almost everything to do 
with the fact that they are far less educated than their counterparts. 
It is worth noting that the trend in relative wages between immigrants and native workers 
may also be reflecting differential period effects on the wages of the various groups, particularly 
towards the latter part of the period under study. After all, there were historic changes in the U.S. 
wage structure during the 1980s and 1990s, and these changes did not affect all skill groups   20
equally (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Murphy and Welch, 1992). There was, for instance, a sizable 
increase in the wage gap between highly educated and less educated workers. Because Mexican 
immigrants are relatively unskilled, the changes in the wage structure imply that the relative 
wage of Mexican immigrants would have fallen between 1980 and 2000 even if the relative 
skills of Mexican immigrants had remained constant. 
  We use a simple approach to show that the wage trends documented in Tables 4 and 5 are 
not greatly affected by the changes in the wage structure. In particular, we calculated the median 
wage of Mexican or non-Mexican immigrants in each of the Census years starting in 1960, and 
computed the fraction of native workers whose wage lies below the immigrant median. This 
approach, of course, results in a statistic that marks the placement of the median Mexican or non-
Mexican immigrant in the native wage distribution. As shown in Table 6, the results of this 
analysis strongly resemble those provided by the trends in the mean log wage gap between 
immigrant and native workers. Among male workers, for example, the trend in the log wage gap 
between newly arrived Mexican immigrants and native workers suggested a general decline in 
the relative skills of the successive immigrant cohorts between 1960 and 2000. Similarly, the 
percentile analysis reported in Table 6 shows that the median newly-arrived Mexican immigrant 
in 1960 placed at the 17
th percentile of the native wage distribution, while the median newly- 
arrived Mexican immigrant in 2000 placed at the 12
th percentile. 
Table 6 also reports the percentile placement of the immigrant workers after adjusting the 
data for differences in educational attainment, age, and state of residence between immigrants 
and natives. These adjusted placements are calculated by obtaining the residuals from a log 
weekly wage regression estimated separately by Census year and gender. The adjusted 
placement reported in the table gives the fraction of native workers who have a residual from this   21
regression below that of the median residual in the samples of Mexican or non-Mexican workers. 
As with the trends in the adjusted mean wage gap, the trend in the adjusted percentile placement 
suggest a decline in the relative skills of newly arrived non-Mexican immigrants from 1960 
through 1990, and an increase in the relative skills of newly-arrived Mexican immigrants 
throughout the entire 1960-2000 period. 
 
Economic Assimilation 
  The 1960-2000 Census data can also be used to measure the extent of “economic 
assimilation,” the improvement in the relative wage of a specific immigrant cohort over time.16 
We define an immigrant cohort in terms of calendar year of arrival and age at arrival. One can 
then use the decennial Censuses to calculate the wage differential between newly arrived 
immigrants and similarly aged natives as of 1970; to recalculate the wage gap between these 
same two groups ten years later in the 1980 Census when the workers are 10 years older; and to 
recalculate it again later in the 1990 and 2000 Censuses when the groups are 20 and 30 years 
older, respectively. 
Consider initially the economic assimilation experienced by non-Mexican immigrants. 
Table 7 reports the economic assimilation trends for various cohorts of this group of immigrants. 
Figure 3 summarizes the results by illustrating the assimilation trends for workers who arrived in 
                                                 
16 It is believed that as many as one-third of the immigrants in the United States eventually return to their 
origin countries. Suppose that the return migrants are disproportionately composed of workers with lower than 
average wages. The intercensal tracking of a particular immigrant cohort would then indicate an improvement in 
relative wages even if no wage convergence is taking place. Alternatively, if the return migrants are the “successes” 
the rate of wage convergence would be underestimated. Because of data limitations, the selection mechanism 
generating the return migration flow is not well understood. An important exception is the work of Ramos (1992), 
who analyzes the return migration decisions of Puerto Ricans living in the United States.   22
the United States when they were 25 to 34 years old. To simplify the presentation, much of our 
discussion will focus directly on the groups illustrated in Figure 3. 
Consider the group of non-Mexican immigrants who arrived in the late 1960s at a 
relatively young age, when they were 25 to 34 years old. Figure 3 shows that these immigrants 
earned .11 log points less than comparably aged native workers at the time of entry. Let’s now 
move forward in time ten years to 1980, when both the immigrants and the natives are thirty-five 
to forty-four years old. The wage disadvantage experienced by these immigrants has now been 
reversed and the non-Mexican immigrant relative wage is .01 log points greater than that of 
comparably aged native workers. The economic assimilation of this group continues during the 
1980s, so that the 1990 Census shows that the wage of this group of non-Mexican immigrants is 
about .10 log points greater than that of comparably aged natives. Finally, the data reveal 
relatively little additional wage growth during the 1990s as both native and immigrant workers 
near retirement. In sum, the process of economic assimilation exhibited by this cohort reduced 
the initial wage disadvantage of these immigrants by just over 20 log points over a thirty-year 
period—with most of the wage growth occurring in the first 20 years after immigration. Because 
this immigrant cohort had a relatively wage at the time of entry, the process of economic 
assimilation allowed the immigrants to narrow the wage disadvantage by “catching up” and 
overtaking comparable native workers. 
The experience of other groups of non-Mexican immigrants who arrived at a relatively 
young age (between 25 and 34) yields roughly the same type of wage convergence regardless of 
the calendar year when they arrived in the United States. Consider, for instance, the non-
Mexican workers who arrived in the United States in the late 1970s. They started out with a 
wage disadvantage of .18 log points, and this disadvantage had disappeared within a decade. In   23
short, the evidence suggests that non-Mexican immigrants experience reasonably rapid wage 
convergence, with the process of economic assimilation increasing the relative wage of the non-
Mexican immigrants who arrived at around age 30 by 20 log points over the first two decades. 
Contrast now these assimilation rates with those found in the population of similarly aged 
(i.e., 25-34 at the time of arrival) Mexican immigrants, as reported in Table 8 and illustrated in 
Figure 4. The figure reveals far less evidence of a consistent pattern of economic improvement 
for a particular cohort of immigrants over time. Although there is a great deal of variability in the 
data, the age-earnings profiles for the various cohorts of Mexican immigrants represented in the 
figure provide little evidence that these immigrants experience systematic and persistent wage 
growth as they accumulate experience in the U.S. labor market. To be specific, consider the 
evolution of relative wages for the Mexican immigrants who arrived in the late 1960s. They 
experienced a -.59 log point wage disadvantage at the time of entry; this disadvantage was 
narrowed substantially to -.45 log points by 1980, but then it began to grow again, to -.54 log 
points in 1990 and -.52 log points in 2000 as the group of older workers now approached 
retirement age. Similarly, the sample of Mexican immigrants who arrived in the late 1970s, for 
example, experienced a flat assimilation path over their observable life cycle. In short, the 
evidence clearly indicates that the path of economic assimilation experienced by Mexican 
immigrants differs strikingly from that experienced by non-Mexican immigrants.  
  Tables 7 and 8 report more detailed evidence on the rate of economic assimilation for 
other cohorts of non-Mexican and Mexican immigrants who arrived at different ages. The 
evidence clearly suggests that immigrants (regardless of whether they are Mexican or not) who 
enter the United States at older ages enter with a greater disadvantage and experience less 
economic assimilation. For example, the relative wage of Mexican immigrants who arrived in   24
the United States in the late 1970s when they were 45 to 54 years old was -.82 log points at the 
time of entry. This group’s relative wage had improved slightly to -.75 log points by 1990. 
Similarly, the relative wage of comparably aged non-Mexican immigrants who entered the 
country in the late 1970s was -.29 at the time of entry and had improved modestly to -.18 log 
points by 1990. 
In contrast, the data indicate that immigrants who enter the United States as children have 
a much smaller wage disadvantage when they first enter the labor market. Consider, for instance, 
the wage experience of non-Mexican immigrants who entered the United States in the late 1960s 
when they were 5 to 14 years old. These persons are first observed in the labor market in 1990 
when they are 25 to 34 years old. Their entry wage stands at +.09 log points. Similarly, the wage 
of the respective cohort of Mexican immigrants is -.17 log points in 1990. Although Mexican 
immigrants still suffer a disadvantage, the size of the disadvantage is far smaller than that 
experienced by groups of Mexican immigrants who entered the United States at older ages (and, 
as we shall see momentarily, is roughly similar to the wage disadvantage experienced by U.S. 
born workers of Mexican ancestry). 
  A number of data and conceptual problems suggest that we should interpret the evolution 
of relative wages for specific cohorts of Mexican immigrants with some caution.  For instance, it 
could be argued that the rates of economic assimilation convergence reported in Table 8 are 
misleading because they compare the wage growth experienced by the typical Mexican 
immigrant with the wage growth experienced by the typical U.S.-born worker.  As we have seen, 
however, the educational attainment of the typical Mexican immigrant is much lower than the 
educational attainment of the typical native worker.  In 1990, for example, only 4 percent of   25
male native workers had 8 or fewer years of schooling, as compared to 57 percent of male 
Mexican immigrants. 
  This huge difference in the human capital of the two groups suggests that it may be of 
interest to compare the wage growth experienced by Mexican immigrants with the wage growth 
experienced by natives who face somewhat similar economic opportunities. Figure 5 replicates 
the economic assimilation analysis by using a different native group as the reference group—
namely the sample of native-born workers who report they have Mexican ancestry.17 The 
information on Mexican ancestry is available on a consistent basis only beginning with the 1980 
Census so that this phase of the research focuses on the 1980-2000 period 
It is of interest to contrast the age-earnings profiles illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. This 
contrast reveals two important findings. First, there is a much smaller wage gap between 
Mexican immigrants and Mexican “natives” than between Mexican immigrants and the typical 
native-born worker. For example, recently arrived Mexican immigrants aged 25-34 in 1980 
earned .50 log points less than the typical young native worker at the time, but earned only -.04 
log points less than the typical U.S.-born worker of Mexican ancestry. Second, although there is 
a great deal of variability in the age-earnings profiles, there is somewhat more evidence of a 
“catching up” effect for Mexican immigrants relative to U.S. natives of Mexican ancestry. Figure 
5, in fact, suggests that Mexican immigrants (at least starting with those arriving in the 1970s) 
experience roughly a .10 log point catching up effect during their first decade in the United 
States. 
                                                 
17 The next section discusses the construction of the sample of Mexican-born workers in the post-1980 
Censuses in detail.   26
There is even stronger evidence of wage convergence when the Mexican immigrants are 
compared to native workers who have the same educational attainment. As shown above, the 
fraction of Mexican men who are high school dropouts hovered around 90 percent prior to 1960 
and was still around 63 percent even by 2000. It is of interest, therefore, to contrast how the bulk 
of the Mexican immigrant workforce fares relative to the (shrinking) sample of native high 
school dropouts. Figure 6 shows that the wage of Mexican immigrant high school dropouts 
increases significantly during their first decade in the United States relative to that of native high 
school dropouts. For example, the newly arrived immigrants aged 25-34 in 1970 earned -.46 log 
points less than native high school dropouts, but this wage gap had narrowed to -.17 log points 
by 1980. Note, however, that this wage convergence slows down considerably (if not stop 
altogether) after 10 years in the United States, so that Mexican immigrants earn substantially less 
than comparably aged native high school dropouts even after 20 years in the country.  
  In addition to the problems introduced by the choice of a baseline group, it is worth 
stressing that the interpretation of the wage evolution experienced by a particular Mexican 
immigrant cohort as a measure of economic assimilation ignores the fact that the sample 
composition of the Mexican immigrant sample is likely changing over time because of return 
migration. The proximity of Mexico to the United States, and the presumed large back-and-forth 
migration flows between the two countries, suggests that Mexican immigrants may have 
relatively large out-migration rates.18  It is evident that the use of synthetic cohorts created by 
                                                 
18 Borjas and Bratsberg (1996), for example, estimate that about 25.9 percent of the legal Mexican 
immigrants who arrived between 1970 and 1974 had left the United States by 1980. This outmigration rate 
compares to a rate of 21.5 percent for all legal immigrants who arrived between 1970 and 1974.   27
matching particular groups of workers across Census surveys may not lead to an accurate 
assessment of economic assimilation for a population that has a large transient component.19  
Suppose, for instance, that the return migrants are disproportionately composed of 
workers who have lower than average wages. The intercensal tracking of a particular immigrant 
cohort (defined in terms of calendar year of entry and age at migration) would then indicate an 
improvement in relative wages even if no wage convergence is taking place. Alternatively, the 
rate of wage convergence would be underestimated if the return migrants are the “successes.” 
  The United States does not collect any information on either the size or the skill 
composition of the out-migrant flow. As a result, the available Census data cannot conclusively 
determine the biases introduced by selective return migration on the observed rate of economic 
assimilation. Nevertheless, there are relatively simple ways of ascertaining the potential 
importance of this bias. For example, let w −
0 be the relative log weekly wage of a cohort of 
Mexican immigrants at the time of entry (t = 0), and let  1
S w  be the relative log weekly wage of 
the sample of survivors in the following period (that is, the relative wage of those immigrants 
who chose to remain in the United States). Assume that there is no sample attrition in the native-
born population and that a fraction r of the immigrants will return to Mexico between t = 0 and t 
= 1. We can then write the observed rate of wage convergence for this particular cohort of 
immigrants as: 
 
(3)   10 1 0 0 [(1 ) ],
SS S R www r wr w −=−− +  
 
                                                 
19 The multiple trips across the border made by many Mexican immigrants also raises issues concerning 
the accuracy and interpretation of the responses by this group to the U.S. Census question on year of arrival in the   28
where  0
S w  is the average relative entry wage of immigrants who remained in the United States; 
and  0
R w  is the average relative entry wage of the immigrants who returned to Mexico. It is 
instructive to rewrite equation (3) as: 
 
(4)   1010 00 () () ,
SS S S R ww ww r ww −= − + −  
 
which shows the relation between the observed rate of wage growth and the true rate of wage 
growth ( 10
SS ww − ) actually experienced by the sample of survivors. The observed rate of wage 
growth is a biased measure of the true rate of wage convergence as long as the skill composition 
of the sample of survivors differs from that of the sample of return migrants (that is, as long as 
00
SR ww ≠ ). 
  We do not have any direct empirical evidence indicating the extent to which the entry 
wage of Mexican immigrants who remain in the United States differs from the entry wage of 
Mexican immigrants who return to Mexico. Equation (4), however, suggests that the numerical 
importance of the bias introduced by nonrandom return migration will not be very “large” for 
reasonable parameter values. Suppose, for instance, that the rate of return migration among 
Mexican immigrants who were enumerated by the U.S. Census at some point of their U.S. 
sojourn is as high as 30 percent.  If the wage differential between the Mexicans who remain in 
the United States and those who leave is on the order of .2 log points (favoring the immigrants 
who return to Mexico), equation (4) then indicates that the true rate of wage convergence is 
about 6 log points higher than the observed rate of wage convergence. The data in Table 8, 
                                                                                                                                                             
United States; see Redstone and Massey (2004) for an analysis of this issue.   29
however, suggest that there would still be relatively little evidence of substantial wage 
convergence even if we add 6 log points to the wage growth experienced by the surviving 
Mexican immigrants. In short, it is very unlikely that the bulk of the Mexican immigrant influx 
will ever reach wage parity with the native-born workforce. 
 
III. Native-Born Workers of Mexican Ancestry 
  As noted earlier, beginning with the 1980 Census, we can observe the socioeconomic 
characteristics of native-born persons who are of Hispanic origin and who in addition claim that 
their Hispanic ancestry is of Mexican origin. The number of native-born workers of Mexican 
ancestry in the U.S. workforce has grown rapidly in the past 20 years and is inevitably going to 
grow even faster in the future. As a result, it is of great interest to determine the skills and 
characteristics of these workers in the labor market. Note that this population does not 
necessarily consist of only second-generation workers, as many workers of higher-order 
generations may claim Mexican ancestry. Nevertheless, the entry of many second-generation 
workers of Mexican ancestry in the near future is bound to lead to a substantial increase in the 
demographic and economic importance of this population in the U.S. labor market. 
  There has been a rapid growth in the size of the population of native-born workers who 
are of Mexican ancestry in the past two decades. In 1980, 2.3 percent of the native-born male 
workforce and 2.3 percent of the native-born female workforce was of Mexican ancestry. By 
2000, these statistics had increased to 3.1 and 3.0 percent. It is of interest to note that if one 
combines the population of Mexican-born workers with that of U.S.-born workers of Mexican 
ancestry, the 2000 Census indicates that these two groups combined make up 7.7 percent of the 
male workforce in the United States and 5.4 percent of the female workforce. These statistics   30
stand in sharp contrast to the data in 1980, where only 3.5 percent of the male workforce and 2.9 
percent of the female workforce could be classified as of Mexican origin. 
  Table 9 documents the sizable difference in the distributions of educational attainment 
between native-born Mexicans and other native-born workers. Like their immigrant counterparts, 
native-born Mexicans have disproportionately large high school dropout rates and 
disproportionately low rates of college graduation. In 2000, for example, 21.0 percent of native-
born Mexicans were high school dropouts and only 11.3 percent were college graduates. This 
contrasts strikingly with the 8.3 percent of native-born non-Mexicans who were high school 
dropouts and 27.9 percent who were college graduates. It is worth stressing that although native-
born Mexicans have relatively low educational attainment (relative to other native-born 
workers), they are far more educated than the Mexican immigrant workforce, where dropout 
rates are around 63 percent in 2000.   
The sizable differences in the educational attainment (as well as in the occupations) of 
Mexican native workers and other natives inevitably lead to equally sizable differences in log 
weekly wages between the two groups. We use the generic regression framework given by 
equation (1) to estimate the adjusted wage differentials separately in each of the Censuses since 
1980. We expand the immigration status variable to include dummy variables indicating if the 
worker is native-born of Mexican ancestry, an immigrant of Mexican origin, a non-Mexican 
immigrant, and a native-born worker of non-Mexican ancestry (the omitted group). 
Panel A of Table 10 reports the trend in the unadjusted relative log weekly wage between 
the various groups and the baseline group of non-Mexican native born workers. In 1980, the 
unadjusted log weekly wage of Mexican immigrants was .41 log points below that of non-
Mexican natives. By 2000, this gap had grown to -.54 log points. It turns out that the economic   31
status of native-born workers of Mexican ancestry also deteriorated significantly over this 
period, from -.24 log points in 1980 to -.31 log points in 2000. 
The table also shows, however, that as with the Mexican immigrant sample, observable 
variables, and particularly educational attainment, tends to explain much of the gap between 
native-born Mexicans and the baseline group. By adjusting simply for differences in educational 
attainment and age, the observed log wage gap of -.31 log points for Mexican natives falls to -.08 
log points. In other words, nearly three-quarters of the wage differential between native-born 
workers of Mexican ancestry and other native-born workers is due to differences in a minimal 
set of observable measures of educational attainment and age.20 
The empirical analysis in the previous section was unable to document that Mexican 
immigrants experience substantial rates of economic assimilation during the immigrants’ work 
life. The empirical analysis summarized in Table 10 shows that a large part of the wage 
disadvantage of Mexican immigrants is likely to persist into the next generation. It seems, 
therefore, that the very large Mexican immigrant influx that entered the United States in recent 
decades has experienced and will likely continue to experience a very different path of economic 
adaptation than other immigrant waves. The reasons for the lagging economic performance of 
this large and fast-growing population will likely be a central concern of social science research 
for decades to come. 
 
IV. Labor Market Impact and Economic Benefits 
Economic theory implies that immigration should lower the wage of competing workers 
and increase the wage of complementary workers. For example, an influx of foreign-born   32
laborers reduces the economic opportunities for laborers—all laborers now face stiffer 
competition in the labor market. At the same time, high-skill natives may gain substantially. 
They pay less for the services that laborers provide, such as painting the house and mowing the 
lawn, and natives who hire these laborers can now specialize in producing the goods and services 
that better suit their skills. 
Because of the policy significance associated with determining the impact of immigration 
on the employment opportunities of native workers, a large literature developed in the past two 
decades attempting to measure this impact. The starting point for much of this literature is the 
fact that immigrants in the United States cluster in a small number of geographic areas. 
Practically all empirical studies in the academic literature exploit this geographic clustering to 
define the empirical exercise that purports to measure the labor market impact of immigration.21 
The typical study defines a metropolitan area (or state) as the labor market that is penetrated by 
immigrants. The study then goes on to calculate a cross-city correlation measuring the relation 
between the native wage in a locality and the relative number of immigrants in that locality. A 
negative correlation, indicating that native wages are lower in markets with many immigrants, 
would suggest that immigrants worsen the employment opportunities of competing native 
workers. 
There is a great deal of dispersion in the findings reported by the various studies in this 
empirical literature. Nevertheless, there is a tendency for the estimated cross-city correlations to 
cluster around zero, helping to create the conventional wisdom that immigrants have little impact 
on the labor market opportunities of native workers, perhaps because “immigrants do jobs that 
                                                                                                                                                             
20 See also Trejo (1997). 
21 Representative studies include Altonji and Card (1991), Card (1990, 2001), and Grossman (1982).    33
natives do not want to do.” It would seem, therefore, that a fundamental implication of the 
standard textbook model of the labor market—that an increase in supply lowers wages—is 
soundly rejected by the data. 
Recent research, however, raises two questions about the validity of interpreting near-
zero cross-city correlations as evidence that immigration has no labor market impact. First, 
immigrants may not be randomly distributed across labor markets. If immigrants tend to cluster 
in cities with thriving economies (and high wages), there would be a built-in positive correlation 
between immigration and wages. This positive correlation would certainly attenuate, and perhaps 
even reverse, whatever negative impact immigration might have had on wages in local labor 
markets. 
Second, natives may respond to the wage impact of immigration by moving their labor or 
capital to other cities. For example, native-owned firms see that cities in Southern California 
flooded by low-skill immigrants pay lower wages to laborers. Employers who hire laborers will 
want to relocate to those cities. The flow of jobs to the immigrant-hit areas cushions the adverse 
effect of immigration on the wage of competing workers in those localities. Similarly, laborers 
living in Michigan were perhaps thinking about moving to California before the immigrants 
entered that state. These laborers learn that immigration reduced their potential wages in 
California and may instead decide to remain where they are or move elsewhere. Moreover, some 
Californians might leave the state to search for better opportunities. 
The flows of capital and labor tend to equalize economic conditions across cities. As a 
result, inter-city comparisons of native wage rates will not be very revealing: capital flows and 
native migration diffuse the impact of immigration across the national economy. In the end, all 
laborers, regardless of where they live, are worse off because there are now many more of them.   34
Because local labor markets adjust to immigration, a number of recent studies have 
emphasized that the labor market impact of immigration may be measurable only at the national 
level.22 Borjas (2003) used this insight to examine the link between immigration and the 
evolution of wages for specific skill groups in the past few decades. His study indicates that by 
analyzing national trends in the labor market and by defining skill groups in terms of both 
educational attainment and work experience, one can make substantial progress in determining 
how immigration alters the employment and earnings opportunities of native workers. 
The empirical analysis reported in this section estimates a labor demand model developed 
by Borjas (2003) to simulate the impact of the Mexican immigrant influx on the wages of 
competing workers. We restrict the simulation to male workers observed in the 1980 and 2000 
Censuses. As in Borjas (2003), the men are classified into four distinct education groups: persons 
who are high school dropouts, high school graduates, persons who have some college, and 
college graduates. Work experience is defined as the number of years that have elapsed since the 
person completed school.23 The analysis is restricted to workers with 1 to 40 years of experience. 
Workers are then grouped into eight different experience groups, indicating if the worker has 1-5 
years of experience, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, and so on. There are, therefore, a total of 32 skill 
groups in the labor market (four education and eight experience groups). 
                                                 
22 Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1997) proposed the hypothesis that the labor market impact of immigration 
may only be measurable at the national level. 
23 The analysis assumes that the age of entry into the labor market is 17 for the typical high school dropout, 
19 for the typical high school graduate, 21 for the typical person with some college, and 23 for the typical college 
graduate. We restrict the analysis to persons who have between 1 and 40 years of experience. By restricting the 
sample to male workers, we are assuming a form of production separability between men and women in the 
production process. The inclusion of women in the analysis does not greatly affect the results, even though the 
allocation of women into the various labor market experience groups likely contains a great deal of measurement 
error.   35
  As in Borjas (2003), suppose the aggregate production function for the national economy 






tK t t L t t QK L  =λ + λ   
 
where Q is output, K is capital, L denotes the aggregate labor input; and v = 1 – 1/σKL, with σKL 
being the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (–∞ < v ≤ 1). The vector λ gives 
technology parameters that shift the production frontier, with λKt + λLt = 1. The aggregate Lt 










 ∑ ,  
 
where Lit gives the number of workers with education i at time t, and ρ = 1 – 1/σE, with σE being 
the elasticity of substitution across these education aggregates (–∞ < ρ ≤ 1). The θit give time-
variant technology parameters that shift the relative productivity of education groups, with Σi θit 
= 1. Finally, the supply of workers in each education group is itself given by an aggregation of 
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where Lijt gives the number of workers in education group i and experience group j at time t 
(given by the sum of Nijt native and Mijt immigrant workers); and η = 1 – 1/σX, with σX being the 
elasticity of substitution across experience classes within an education group (–∞ < η ≤ 1). 
Equation (7) assumes that the technology coefficients αij are constant over time, with Σj αij = 1. 
Borjas (2003) shows that the key parameters σX and σE can be estimated by regressing 
the log wage of particular education-experience groups on the log of the size of the workforce in 
the various cells, and instrumenting the supply variable by the immigrant share in that skill cell. 
We re-estimated the econometric framework using data from the 1960-2000 IPUMS samples.24 
Our elasticity estimates are σX = 2.9 and σE= 2.3. The empirical implementation of the three-
level CES technology described above does not use any data on the aggregate capital stock so 
that σK cannot be directly estimated. Hamermesh (1993, p. 92) concludes that the aggregate U.S. 
economy can be reasonably described by a Cobb-Douglas production function, suggesting that 
σKL equals one. We use this estimate in the simulation reported below. 
  The factor price elasticity giving the impact on the wage of factor y of an increase in the 













It is easy to show that the factor price elasticities depend on the income shares accruing to the 
various factors and on the three elasticities of substitution that lie at the core of the three-level 
                                                 
24 Borjas (2003) estimated the model using data from the 1960-1990 Census and from the merged 1999-
2001 Current Population Surveys. The elasticity estimates obtained using the 1960-2000 Census data differ slightly 
from those reported in the original paper.   37
CES framework.25 The marginal productivity condition for the typical worker in education group 
s and experience group x can be written as wsx = D(K, L11, . . . , L18, . . . , L41, . . . , L48). Assuming 
that the capital stock is constant, the net impact of immigration on the log wage of group (s, x) 
is: 
 




∆= ε+ ε+ ε ∑∑ ∑  
 
where mij gives the percentage change in labor supply due to immigration in cell (i, j). Because 


















so that the baseline population used to calculate the percent increase in labor supply averages out 
the size of the native workforce in the skill cell and treats the pre-existing immigrant population 
as part of the “native” stock. 
The top panel of Table 11 summarizes the results of the simulation. The immigrant influx 
of the 1980s and 1990s lowered the wage of most native workers, particularly of those workers 
at the bottom and top of the education distribution. The wage fell by 8.2 percent for high school 
dropouts and by 3.8 percent for college graduates. In contrast, the wage of high school graduates 
                                                 
25 We assume that the share of income accruing to all labor groups is 0.7. We then used data from the 1990 
Census to calculate the income share accruing to each of the various education-experience cells.   38
and workers with some college fell by just over 2 percent. Overall, the immigrant influx from 
1980 to 2000 is estimated to have reduced the wage of the typical native worker by 3.3 percent. 
This framework provides a simple mechanism for establishing the labor market impact of 
Mexican immigration. In particular, we simulated the model to predict a new set of labor market 
impacts under the counterfactual assumption that there had been no Mexican immigration (either 
legal or illegal) between 1980 and 2000. This assumption redefines the labor supply shocks 





















,2000 ij M  gives the size of the immigrant workforce in skill group (i, j) in 2000 under the 
assumption that no Mexican immigrants entered the United States between 1980 and 2000. 
The second column of Table 11 shows the predicted labor market effects when the supply 
shocks are given by equation (1). Mexican immigration, which is predominantly low-skill, 
accounts for all of the adverse impact of immigration on low-skill native workers. It is also 
worth noting that the earnings of college graduates would have fallen by 3.9 percent if there had 
been no Mexican immigration, as compared to the 3.8 percent decline that occurred with the 
actual flow. In other words, the influx of low-skill Mexican immigrants barely improves the 
wage of high-skill workers. 
As emphasized above, these simulations assume the capital stock is constant so that the 
results summarized in the top panel of Table 11 represent the short-run impact of immigration. 
An alternative simulation would measure the impacts under the assumption that the capital stock   39
adjusts completely to the increased labor supply. In effect, this alternative simulation would 
assume that the rental price of capital (rather than the capital stock) is constant. In other words, 
the adjustment of the capital stock to immigration would reduce the rental rate of capital back to 
its pre-existing, equilibrium level. 
The maintained assumption that σKL equals one implies that the predicted long-run wage 
impact on the log wage of group (s, x) is: 
 
(12)   ,, , log , sx K sx sx sx sx sj sj sx ij ij
jx is j
ws K m m m
≠≠
∆= + ε+ ε+ ε ∑ ∑∑   
 
where sK is capital’s share of income (assumed to be 0.3); and K   is the percent change in the 
capital stock induced by immigration. The assumption that σKL is unity implies that the change in 
the capital stock is a weighted average of the immigrant supply shocks in the various education-
experience groups, where the weights are the shares of income accruing to the various groups.26 
  The bottom panel of Table 11 uses equation (12) to predict the long-run impact of the 
1980-2000 immigrant influx. As expected, the labor market impact of immigration is muted in 
the long-run, as capital adjusts to the increased workforce. In fact, there’s barely a change in the 
wage of the typical worker. The unbalanced nature of the immigrant supply shock in terms of the 
skill distribution, however, implies that there are distributional effects. The first column of the 
table reveals that high school dropouts still experience a sizable wage reduction, even in the long 
                                                 
26 To simplify notation, let n be the subscript indicating the education-experience skill group (n = 1,…,32). 
The implied change in the capital stock  /, nn L
n
Ks m s =∑  where sL is labor’s share of income. Note that equation 
(12) differs from equation (9) only by adding the constant  k sK  to each group. Put differently, full capital 
adjustment alters the absolute wage impact of immigration but leaves the relative wage effects unchanged.   40
run, of about 4.8 percentage points. The increase in the capital stock, however, completely 
removes the wage loss suffered by college graduates. 
  The second column of the panel shows the predicted long-run impact under the 
counterfactual that no Mexicans migrated to the United States between 1980 and 2000. It is 
evident that in the absence of Mexican immigration, low-skill workers would have benefited 
(through a 2.7 percent wage increase) from the complementarities that arise when the immigrant 
influx is composed mainly of high-skill workers. 
Immigration may also affect the economic welfare of natives through its impact on the 
relative prices of goods and services.27 The skill distribution of Mexican immigrants and their 
concentration in low-skill occupations suggest that Mexican immigration may serve to expand 
the supply and lower the U.S. prices of non-traded goods and services that are low-skill labor 
intensive.  In fact, a much larger share of Mexican immigrants than of U.S. natives is employed 
in low-skill service jobs such as private household occupations, food preparation occupations, 
and gardening. In 2000, for example, 20.9 percent of Mexican immigrants and only 6.5 percent 
of native-born workers were employed in the subset of occupations classified as “food 
preparation and serving” or “buildings and grounds cleaning and maintenance.” American 
consumers who spend more on low-skill intensive non-traded goods and services will tend to 
disproportionately benefit from the recent wave of Mexican immigration. 
Some recent exploratory work has exploited cross-area variation in changes in low-skill 
immigrants as a share of the workforce to estimate the impacts of increased low-skill 
immigration on the supply and prices of low-skill intensive services.  This approach will tend to 
                                                 
27 Rivera-Batiz (1983) provides a useful summary of the implications of alternative multi-sector trade 
models for the distributional impacts on rich countries of low-skill immigration from poor to rich countries.   41
understate the price impacts on non-traded services intensively employing new low-skill 
immigrants to the extent the expansion in the overall national supply of less-educated workers 
also affects low-immigrant receiving areas by altering native labor and capital flows.  
Khananusapkul (2004) finds using U.S. Census data from 1970 to 2000 that a one percentage 
point increase in the share of low-skill female immigrants in a metropolitan area increases the 
proportion of private household workers by 6 percentage points and lowers the wages in the 
private household sector by 3 percent.  This evidence indicates a direct supply expansion in the 
low-skill female intensive sector when more low-skill female immigrants are available in a labor 
market. Cortes (2004) examines the impacts on prices and consumer expenditures on some non-
traded services of changes in the ratio of low-skill Mexican immigrants to native workers across 
U.S. metropolitan areas and states from 1980 to 2000.  She presents suggestive (but quite 
imprecise) preliminary estimates indicating an increase in low-skill Mexican immigrants to an 
areas reduces the price of food away from home and increase the share of household reporting 
expenditures on housekeeping, gardening, and food away from home. 
The large growth and predominantly low-skilled nature of Mexican immigration to the 
United States over the past two decades appears to have played a modest role in the widening of 
the U.S. wage structure by adversely affecting the earnings of less-educated native workers and 
improving the earnings of college graduates.  U.S. natives (particularly high-skill natives) are 
likely to benefit from greater availability and reduced prices of non-traded goods and services 
that are intensive in low-skill labor.   
 
V.  Summary   42
  This paper uses the IPUMS data from 1900 through 2000 to document the evolution of 
the Mexican-born workforce in the U.S. labor market. It is well known, of course, that there has 
been a rapid rise in Mexican immigration to the United States in recent years. Interestingly, the 
share of Mexican immigrants in the U.S. workforce declined steadily beginning in the 1920s 
before beginning to rise in the 1960s. It was not until 1980 that the relative number of Mexican 
immigrants in the U.S. workforce was at the 1920 level. 
The analysis of the economic performance of these immigrants throughout the 20
th 
Century yields a number of interesting and potentially important findings: 
  1. Mexican immigrants have much less educational attainment than either native-born 
workers or non-Mexican immigrants. These differences in human capital account for nearly 
three-quarters of the very large wage disadvantage suffered by Mexican immigrants in recent 
decades. 
  2. Although the earnings of non-Mexican immigrants converge to those of their native-
born counterparts as the immigrants accumulate work experience in the U.S. labor market, this 
type of wage convergence has been much weaker on average for Mexican immigrants than for 
other immigrant groups. 
  3. Although native-born workers of Mexican ancestry have levels of human capital and 
earnings that far exceed those of Mexican immigrants, the economic performance of these 
native-born workers lags behind that of native workers who are not of Mexican ancestry. Much 
of the wage gap between the two groups of native-born workers can be explained by the large 
difference in educational attainment between the two groups. 
  4. The large Mexican influx in recent decades widened the U.S. wage structure by 
adversely affecting the earnings of less-educated native workers and improving the earnings of   43
college graduates. These wage effects have, in turn, lowered the prices of non-traded goods and 
services that are low-skill labor intensive. 
  There is little evidence that the influx of Mexican-born workers into the United States is 
slowing down as we enter a new century, and there is also little evidence that the skill 
composition of the Mexican influx is changing from what it has been in the past. The continued 
migration of Mexican workers into the United States, and the inevitable rapid growth of the 
group of native-born workers of Mexican ancestry, suggest that the economic consequences of 
this low-skill migration influx are only beginning to be felt.  
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Figure 1. Growth of Mexican Immigrants in the U.S. workforce, 1900-2000 
 




























































Notes: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged 18-64.   48
Figure 2. Mexican Immigrants as a Share of U.S. Immigrant Work-Force 
 
 


























Figure 3. Wage growth of non-Mexican immigrant cohorts over time,  
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Figure 4. Wage growth of Mexican immigrant cohorts over time,  
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Figure 5. Wage growth of Mexican immigrant cohorts over time,  
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Figure 6. Wage growth of Mexican immigrant cohorts over time,  
relative to native worker,  
restricted to sample of high school dropouts 
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Table 1. Regional concentration of the Mexican-born workforce, selected states 
 
 1900 1910 1920 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Percent of Mexican immigrants residing in:       
Arizona  17.2 10.7 12.5  7.6  5.4  4.1 4.0 3.0 3.3 4.4 
California  7.8 19.9 17.9 40.4 40.3 44.6 55.1 58.7 57.4 42.1 
Colorado  0.0 1.3 3.1 1.9 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.8 2.0 
Florida  0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.4 2.2 
Georgia  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 2.2 
Illinois  1.6 0.2 1.4 3.0 2.5 6.6 8.2 8.6 7.3 7.3 
Kansas  0.0  12.2 2.9 2.2 1.5 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 
New Jersey  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 
New Mexico  10.9 5.3 4.2 2.8 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 
New York  0.0 0.7 0.6 1.5 0.7 1.7 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.7 
North Carolina  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 2.0 
Texas  62.5 46.2 50.6 35.3 39.1 33.2 23.4 21.2 20.0 19.9 
            
Mexican immigrants as percent of state’s workforce:       
Arizona  19.3 17.1 23.6  7.8  4.3  2.3 2.2 2.9 4.8  10.2 
California  0.7 2.3 2.9 2.2 2.0 1.8 2.4 6.2 9.8  14.8 
Colorado  0.0 0.5 2.0 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.1 4.8 
Florida  0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 1.6 
Georgia  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.8 
Illinois  0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.8 3.1 6.5 
Kansas  0.0 2.7 1.2 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7 2.9 
New Jersey  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 
New Mexico  10.6 6.0 8.6 3.2 1.8 1.2 1.0 2.1 4.0 7.3 
New York  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.1 
North Carolina  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.6 
Texas  3.4 4.3 7.7 3.1 3.0 2.4 1.9 3.7 6.0  10.9 
 
Notes: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged 18-64.   54
Table 2. Percent distribution of educational attainment 
 
   1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Male workers          
Native-born            
High school dropouts  67.3% 61.3% 52.0%  38.4%  23.8% 12.9%  8.7%
High school graduates  20.0 24.2  27.8  35.2  39.1 36  34.5 
Some college  6.4 7.4  9.4  11.9  16.8  26.6  29.4 
College graduates  6.3 7.1  10.8  14.5  20.3  24.5  27.4 
Mexican immigrants            
High school dropouts  94.6 91.2  88.3  82.6  77.2 70.4 63.0 
High school graduates  3.0 6.7  6.7  11.7  14.3  19.0  25.1 
Some college  1.0 1.5  2.7  3.6  5.7 7.8 8.5 
College graduates  1.4 0.6  2.4  2.2  2.9 2.8 3.4 
Non-Mexican immigrants            
High school dropouts  84.4 76.4  64.5  45.5  30.2 21.0 17.0 
High school graduates  9.2 14.5  16.8  23.9  26.7 26.0 25.8 
Some college  2.8 4.0  8.3  11.7  15.2  21.3  20.9 
College graduates  3.7 5.1  10.4  18.9  27.9  31.7  36.3 
Female workers          
Native-born            
High school dropouts  50.6 46.3  42.4  31.2  19.2  9.8  6.5 
High school graduates  32.1 35.3  37.6  45.3  47.3 38.7 32.8 
Some college  9.5 10.1  11.0  12.6  17.9 29.9 33.5 
College graduates  7.8 8.3  9.0  11 15.6  21.6  27.3 
Mexican immigrants            
High school dropouts  84.5 82.4  83.9  77.3  72.9 64.7 57.0 
High school graduates  12.5 10.3  11.4  16.9  17.7 21.9 26.6 
Some college  2.1 4.4  2.7  4.5  7.0  10.5  11.8 
College graduates  0.9 2.9  2  1.4  2.4 3.0 4.5 
Non-Mexican immigrants            
High school dropouts  79.2 68.5  59.3  43.9  30.1 20.0 15.5 
High school graduates  15.8 22.3  25.5  33.7  35.2 31.1 27.6 
Some college  2.8 5.0  9.6  12.6  16.8  24.0  24.4 
College graduates  2.2 4.2  5.7  9.9  17.9  24.9  32.6 
 
Notes: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged 18-64. 
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Table 3. Percent of Mexican immigrants employed in “Top 10” occupations  




1900 1910 1920 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Male workers            
Operatives, nec 
(690)  0.0  1.0  1.7  7.2 10.8 10.6 18.2 20.1 16.0 15.5 
Laborers, nec 
(970)  43.3 44.4 42.8 24.9 22.6 17.1 11.1 11.7 11.9 11.7 
Farm Laborers  
(820)  15.0 26.4 21.1 32.2 24.3 17.7 14.9 10.5  9.5  6.3 
Gardeners  (930)  0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.6 1.5 2.9 2.6 4.8 5.8 
Cooks  (754)  0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.9 1.4 1.7 3.3 4.9 5.4 
Truck Drivers 
(683)  0.0 2.2 0.2 1.9 3.5 4.4 2.8 2.2 3.5 4.2 
Managers, 
Proprietors nec 
(290)  1.7 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.2 3.1 2.2 3.4 3.9 3.9 
Carpenters  (510) 0.0 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.5 3.6 
Janitors  (770)  0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.2 1.8 3.4 4.0 4.4 3.5 
Foremen, nec 
(523)  0.0 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.5 1.4 1.6 2.4 1.9 3.2 
            
Female workers            
Operatives, nec 
(690) 0.0  5.0  10.1 31.5 30.9 29.8 34.9 35.8 26.9 21.2
Private 
household (720)  50.0  25.0  16.0 14.7 10.3 13.6 5.4 2.8 4.2 9.0
Clerical workers 
(390) 0.0  0.0  0.8 1.8 2.9 3.2 2.8 5.1 5.4 7.6
Farm Laborers  
(820) 0.0  30.0  13.9 5.6 2.9 4.7 7.4 8.7 7.7 5.0
Cooks (754)  0.0  0.0  1.3 0.9 1.5 2.7 1.8 2.4 3.7 4.9




(790) 25.0  0.0  1.3 1.8 2.9 4.0 4.3 1.9 2.3 4.3
Cashiers (320)  0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 1.5 0.5 2.0 2.1 3.3 3.7
Managers, 
officials, 
proprietors, nec  0.0  0.0  3.8 0.0 4.4 2.0 1.2 1.7 2.7 3.3
Attendants, nec 
(731) 0.0  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 1.7 2.1 2.9
 
Notes: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged 18-64. 
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Table 4. Trends in immigrant wages relative to native-born workers 
 
 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Male workers         
A.  Unadjusted  wage  gap         
Mexican immigrants  -.475  -.385  -.365  -.390  -.408     -.544    -.533 
  (.022) (.030) (.016) (.014) (.004) (.003) (.002) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  .175 .131 .104 .072  -.022  -.004  -.034 
  (.005) (.007) (.005) (.005) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
         
B, Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age 
       
Mexican  immigrants  -.453 -.352 -.249 -.205 -.148 -.149 -.144 
  (.020  (.028) (.015) (.013) (.003) (.003) (.002) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  .092 .093 .102 .035  -.048  -.042  -.073 
  (.004) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
         
C. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of residence               
Mexican  immigrants  -.444 -.377 -.304 -.255 -.202 -.208 -.176 
  (.019) (.027) (.014) (.013) (.003) (.003) (.002) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  -.016  .019  .016 -.027 -.062 -.104 -.106 
  (.004) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.001) 
         
Female workers         
D.  Unadjusted  wage  gap         
Mexican  immigrants  -.329 -.193 -.335 -.217 -.135 -.316 -.401 
  (.056) (.068) (.033) (.025) (.005) (.004) (.003) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  .026 .065 .052 .057 .060 .081 .036 
  (.009) (.013) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
         
E. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education,  age         
Mexican  immigrants  -.247 -.104 -.177 -.049  .035 -.015 -.074 
  (.051) (.064) (.031) (.023) (.005) (.004) (.003) 
  Non-Mexican  immigrants  .080 .123 .100 .078 .045 .072 .025 
  (.008) (.013) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
         
F. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of residence               
Mexican  immigrants  -.246 -.132 -.230 -.094 -.038 -.120 -.137 
  (.050) (.062) (.031) (.023) (.005) (.004) (.003) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  -.013 .021  -.001 .010 .011  -.017  -.035 
  (.008) (.012) (.007) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The numbers of observations in the male regressions are as 
follows: 208,729 in the 1940 Census, 79,824 in the 1950 Census, 362,823 in the 1960 Census, 393,653 in the 1970 
Census, 2,546,859 in the 1980 Census, 2,809,917 in the 1990 Census, and 3,164,510 in the 2000 Census. The 
numbers of observations in the female regressions are: 74,101 in the 1940 Census, 33,777 in the 1950 Census, 
163,027 in the 1960 Census, 227,736 in the 1970 Census, 1,961,549 in the 1980 Census, 2,405,910 in the 1990 
Census, and 2,800,811 in the 2000 Census. The reported coefficients are log wage gaps relative to native-born 
workers.    57
Table 5. Trends in the relative wage of newly arrived immigrants 
 
 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Male workers         
A.  Unadjusted  wage  gap         
Mexican immigrants  -.342  ---  -.526   -.593  -.647   -.812   -.764 
  (.258)  ---   (.044)   (.031)   (.007)   (.006)   (.004) 
Non-Mexican immigrants    .101  ---  -.074  -.160  -.218  -.289   -.203 
   (.042)  ---   (.014)   (.011)  (0.004)  (0.004)   (.003) 
         
B. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age 
       
Mexican  immigrants  -.408 ---  -.316 -.254 -.214 -.201 -.164 
  (.230) ---  (.039) (.028) (.006) (.005) (.004) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  -.004 ---  -.077 -.177 -.210 -.200 -.149 
  (.037) ---  (.013) (.010) (.004) (.003) (.003) 
         
C. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of residence               
Mexican  immigrants  -.459  ---  -.396 -.325 -.272 -.277 -.187 
  (.219)    (.038) (.027) (.006) (.005) (.004) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  -.111  ---  -.166 -.238 -.230 -.272 -.180 
  (.035)    (.012) (.010) (.004) (.003) (.003) 
         
Female workers         
D.  Unadjusted  wage  gap         
Mexican  immigrants  ---  ---  -.557 -.286 -.248 -.503 -.544 
      (.084) (.056) (.011) (.010) (.007) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  -.125  ---  -.046  .018 -.040 -.137 -.150 
  (.053)    (.019) (.014) (.005) (.005) (.004) 
         
E. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education,  age         
Mexican  immigrants  ---  ---  -.334 -.072  .001 -.092 -.096 
      (.079) (.053) (.011) (.009) (.006) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  -.004  ---  .018  .054 -.025 -.078 -.100 
  (.048)    (.018) (.013) (.005) (.004) (.004) 
         
F. Adjusted wage gap, adjusts for 
education, age, state of residence               
Mexican  immigrants  ---  ---  -.395 -.133 -.078 -.214 -.144 
      (.077) (.052) (.011) (.009) (.006) 
Non-Mexican  immigrants  -.119  ---  -.086 -.022 -.066 -.181 -.155 
  (.046)    (.017) (.013) (.005) (.004) (.004) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. A newly arrived immigrant has been in the United States five 
years or less as of the time of the Census.  The numbers of observations in the male regressions are as follows: 
186,314 in the 1940 Census, 343,028 in the 1960 Census, 377,656 in the 1970 Census, 2,416,854 in the 1980 
Census, 2,612,394 in the 1990 Census, and 2,820,033 in the 2000 Census. The numbers of observations in the 
female regressions are as follows: 69,147 in the 1940 Census, 154,868 in the 1960 Census, 217,844 in the 1970 
Census, 1,856,973 in the 1980 Census, 2,250,119 in the 1990 Census, and 2,541,595 in the 2000 Census. The 
reported wage coefficients are log wage gaps relative to native-born workers.   58
Table 6. Placement of median immigrant in native wage distribution 
 
  Percentile placement of median 
Mexican immigrant    Percentile placement of median 
non-Mexican immigrant 
Group: 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000   1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Male, unadjusted 
placement 
             
All  immigrant  26.2 22.0 23.6 19.7 19.0    53.6  53.4 47.7 47.8 45.5 
Recent  immigrants  17.0 14.7 14.1 12.4 12.3  40.5  34.2 30.3 27.7 32.8 
              
Male, adjusts for 
differences in 
education, age, state 
o f   r e s i d e n c e               
All  immigrants  26.7 27.1 33.4 34.9 37.8  49.6  46.7 43.6 41.2 41.9 
Recent  immigrants  19.5 22.4 28.0 29.8 35.9  35.9  29.0 29.6 28.3 36.6 
              
Female, unadjusted 
placement              
All  immigrants  27.5 33.5 38.1 30.6 25.9  50.7  52.1 52.4 52.3 49.7 
Recent  immigrants  19.8 31.7 32.1 22.8 20.9  43.7  47.4 44.1 37.8 36.0 
              
Female, adjusts for 
differences in 
education, age, state 
o f   r e s i d e n c e               
All  immigrants  29.0 39.1 42.9 38.6 37.6  46.6  48.0 48.5 46.2 45.7 
Recent  immigrants  21.7 36.5 40.3 32.4 36.4  41.6  42.8 41.1 34.1 36.0 
 
Notes: The statistics giving the “unadjusted placement” reported in this table give the fraction of the relevant native 
workforce that has a wage below that of the median of the Mexican or non-Mexican immigrant. The adjusted 
placement gives the fraction of the relevant native workforce that has a residual from a wage regression that lies 
below the median residual of the Mexican or non-Mexican immigrant, where the regression includes a vector of 
educational attainment fixed effects, a third-order polynomial in the worker’s age, and a vector of fixed effects 
indicating the worker’s state of residence.   59
Table 7. Evolution of relative wage of non-Mexican immigrants over time 
(relative to native workers) 
 
Year of entry  Age at migration 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1955-1959 25-34  -0.039 0.127 --- --- --- 
1955-1959 35-44  -0.080 0.067 --- --- --- 
1955-1959 45-54  -0.122 -0.005 --- --- --- 
1965-1969  5-14  --- --- ---  0.087 0.110
1965-1969 15-24  ---  ---  -0.019 0.062 0.037
1965-1969 25-34  ---  -0.107 0.014 0.101 0.124
1965-1969 35-44  ---  -0.182 -0.138 -0.017 --- 
1965-1969 45-54  ---  -0.268 -0.231  --- --- 
1975-1979  5-14  --- --- --- ---  0.107
1975-1979  15-24  --- --- ---  0.054 0.055
1975-1979 25-34  ---  ---  -0.176 -0.017 -0.018
1975-1979 35-44  ---  ---  -0.203 -0.130 -0.065
1975-1979 45-54  ---  ---  -0.291 -0.178 --- 
1985-1989  15-24  --- --- --- ---  -0.043
1985-1989  25-34  --- --- ---  -0.174 -0.096
1985-1989  35-44  --- --- ---  -0.262 -0.262
1985-1989  45-54  --- --- ---  -0.345 -0.354
1995-1999  25-34  --- --- --- ---  0.004
 
Note: The “age at migration” reflects the age of the workers at the time of the Census immediately following the 
arrival of the immigrant cohort.   60
Table 8. Evolution of relative wage of Mexican immigrants over time 
(relative to native workers) 
 
Year of entry  Age at migration 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
1955-1959 25-34  -0.381 -0.352 --- --- --- 
1955-1959 35-44  -0.626 -0.381 --- --- --- 
1955-1959 45-54  -0.835 -0.660 --- --- --- 
1965-1969 5-14  ---  ---  ---  -0.173 -0.271
1965-1969 15-24  ---  ---  -0.231 -0.360 -0.440
1965-1969 25-34  ---  -0.593 -0.445 -0.537 -0.517
1965-1969 35-44  ---  -0.628 -0.529 -0.606 --- 
1965-1969 45-54  ---  -0.711 -0.524  --- --- 
1975-1979  5-14  --- --- --- ---  -0.261
1975-1979 15-24  ---  ---  ---  -0.352 -0.423
1975-1979 25-34  ---  ---  -0.543 -0.603 -0.591
1975-1979 35-44  ---  ---  -0.759 -0.783 -0.646
1975-1979 45-54  ---  ---  -0.816 -0.753 --- 
1985-1989  15-24  --- --- --- ---  -0.361
1985-1989 25-34  ---  ---  ---  -0.626 -0.554
1985-1989 35-44  ---  ---  ---  -0.880 -0.716
1985-1989 45-54  ---  ---  ---  -1.029 -0.732
1995-1999  25-34  --- --- --- ---  -0.574
 
Note: The “age at migration” reflects the age of the workers at the time of the Census immediately following the 
arrival of the immigrant cohort.   61
Table 9. Distribution of educational attainment for Mexican native-born workers 
  
 1980 1990 2000 
Male workers     
Native-born of Mexican ancestry       
High school dropouts  45.5  27.6  21.0 
High school graduates  33.4  38.6  40.0 
Some  college  14.3 24.7 27.7 
College graduates  6.7  9.1  11.3 
All other native born workers       
High school dropouts  23.3  12.5  8.3 
High school graduates  39.3  35.9  34.3 
Some  college  16.8 26.7 29.5 
College  graduates  20.6 24.9 27.9 
Mexican  immigrants     
High school dropouts  77.2  70.4  63.0 
High school graduates  14.3  19.0  25.1 
Some  college  5.7 7.8 8.5 
College  graduates  2.9 2.8 3.4 
     
Female workers     
Native-born of Mexican ancestry       
High school dropouts  39.6  23.0  16.5 
High school graduates  42.0  41.1  38.4 
Some  college  13.4 27.2 32.1 
College graduates  5.0  8.7  13.0 
All other native born workers       
High school dropouts  18.8  9.4  6.2 
High school graduates  47.4  38.6  32.6 
Some  college  18.1 30.0 33.5 
College  graduates  15.8 22.0 27.7 
Mexican  immigrants     
High school dropouts  72.9  64.7  57.0 
High school graduates  17.7  21.9  26.6 
Some  college  7.0 10.5 11.8 
College  graduates  2.4 3.0 4.5 
 
Notes: All statistics are calculated using the sample of workers aged 18-64. 
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Table 10. Trends in the relative wage of the Mexican-origin population  
  
 1980 1990 2000 
Male workers      
A. Relative weekly wage (relative to other 
natives) 
    
Mexican immigrant  -.414  -.553  -.543 
 (.004)  (.003)  (.002) 
Other immigrant  .017  -.004  -.044 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.002) 
Native-born of Mexican ancestry  -.238  -.298  -.310 
 (.003)  (.003)  (.003) 
      
B. Adjusted relative weekly wage (adjusts for 
education, age) 
    
Mexican immigrant  -.151  -.154  -.148 
 (.003)  (.003)  (.002) 
Other immigrant  -.049  -.045  -.076 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.001) 
Native-born of Mexican ancestry  -.075  -.098  -.075 
 (.003)  (.002)  (.002) 
      
Female workers      
C. Relative weekly wage (relative to other 
natives) 
    
Mexican immigrant  -.137  -.319  -.405 
 (.005)  (.004)  (.003) 
Other immigrant  .058  .077  .032 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.002) 
Native-born of Mexican ancestry  -.093  -.134  -.150 
 (.003)  (.003)  (.003) 
      
D. Adjusted relative weekly wage (adjusts for 
education, age) 
    
Mexican immigrant  .036  -.015  -.073 
 (.005)  (.004)  (.003) 
Other immigrant  .045  .072  .025 
 (.002)  (.002)  (.002) 
Native-born of Mexican ancestry  .015  .013  .022 
 (.003)  (.003)  (.003) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The numbers of observations in the regressions are as follows: 
2,546,859 in the 1980 Census, 2,809,917 in the 1990 Census, and 3,164,510 in the 2000 Census. The reported wage 
coefficients are log wage gaps relative to native-born workers of non-Mexican ancestry. 
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Table 11. Comparing the actual impact of the 1980-2000 immigrant influx  
with a counterfactual of no Mexican immigration during period 
(Predicted percent change in the weekly wage) 
 
 
Specification/Group: Actual  impact  Counterfactual: No Mexican immigration 
Short-run: Capital is fixed     
All workers  -3.3%  -2.2% 
High school dropouts  -8.2%  -0.1% 
High school graduates  -2.2  -1.2 
Some college  -2.6  -2.3 
College graduates  -3.8  -3.9 
    
Long-run: Capital is perfectly 
elastic 
  
All workers  0.1  0.6 
High school dropouts  -4.8  2.7 
High school graduates  1.1  1.6 
Some college  0.8  0.5 
College graduates  -0.5  -1.1 
 
Notes: The simulation models in equations (9) and (12) generate wage effects for specific education-experience 
cells. We used the size of the native-born workforce in 2000 in each of the cells to calculate the weighted aggregates 
reported in this table. The predicted percent changes refer to the product of the predicted log wage change times 
100.  
 
 